

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA  
CHARLOTTE DIVISION  
CIVIL NO. 3:14CV608-FDW-DSC**

<b>SYLVIA MARSHALL,</b>	)
Plaintiff,	)
	)
vs.	)
	)
<b>CAROLYN W. COLVIN,</b>	)
Commissioner of Social	)
Security Administration,	)
Defendant.	)
	)

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**MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF REMAND**

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Memorandum and Recommendation.

## **I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

On October 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) alleging that she was unable to work as of April 1, 2008. (Tr. 196, 199).

Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff subsequently requested a hearing which was held on June 16, 2011. (Tr. 55). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s claim in a decision dated July 12, 2011. (Tr. 79). Following review by the Appeals Council, the case was remanded for a new hearing on February 16, 2012. (Tr. 94). The ALJ conducted a second hearing on March 21, 2013. (Tr. 37).

On June 12, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 18-36). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (Tr. 23). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered from obesity, hypertension, headaches, “status post posterior lumbar interbody fusion and instrumentation,” bipolar II disorder, and anxiety disorder, which were severe impairments within the meaning of the regulations but did not meet or equal any listing in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Tr. 23-26). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild restrictions in activities of daily living and social functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. (Tr. 25).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)<sup>1</sup> to

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<sup>1</sup>The Social Security Regulations define “Residual Functional Capacity” as “what [a claimant] can still do despite his limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The Commissioner is required to “first assess the nature and extent of [the claimant’s] physical limitations and then determine [the claimant’s] Residual Functional Capacity for work

perform a full range of sedentary work<sup>2</sup> limited to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks.” (Tr. 26-29.)

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a certified nursing assistant or machine operator. (Tr. 29-30).

The ALJ applied Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and RFC to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and determined that Rule 201.28 mandated a finding of not disabled. (Tr. 30). Accordingly, the ALJ found that she was not disabled during the relevant period. (Tr. 30-31).

Plaintiff filed a timely Request for Review by the Appeals Council. On September 4, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review. (Tr. 1).

Plaintiff filed the present action on October 30, 2014. She assigns error to the ALJ’s formulation of her mental RFC and particularly to the ALJ’s failure to account for her moderate difficulty with concentration, persistence or pace. See Plaintiff’s “Supplemental Memorandum ...” at 3-5 (document #20). The parties’ cross-Motions are ripe for disposition.

## **II. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th

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activity on a regular and continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b).

<sup>2</sup>Sedentary work involves lifting no more than ten pounds at a time and occasional lifting or carrying of articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Id. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. Id.

Cir. 1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The District Court does not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).

As the Social Security Act provides, “[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), the Fourth Circuit defined “substantial evidence” thus:

Substantial evidence has been defined as being “more than a scintilla and do[ing] more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

See also Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976) (“We note that it is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence”).

The Fourth Circuit has long emphasized that it is not for a reviewing court to weigh the evidence again, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, assuming the Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d at 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345; and Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d at 775. Indeed, this is true even if the reviewing court disagrees with the outcome – so long as there is “substantial evidence” in the record to support the final decision below. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).

### **III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIM**

The question before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff became disabled at any time.<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination of her RFC. The ALJ is solely responsible for assessing a claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c) & 416.946(c). In making that assessment, the ALJ must consider the functional limitations resulting from the claimant's medically determinable impairments. SSR96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184, at \*2. The ALJ must also "include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence." Id.

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing her RFC by showing how her impairments affect her functioning. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(c) & 416.912(c); see also, e.g., Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[t]he burden of persuasion . . . to demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant, even when the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at step five"); Plummer v. Astrue, No. 5:11-cv-06-RLV-DSC, 2011 WL 7938431, at \*5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2011) (Memorandum and Recommendation) ("[t]he claimant bears the burden of providing evidence establishing the degree to which her impairments limit her RFC") (citing Stormo), adopted, 2012 WL 1858844 (May 22, 2102), aff'd, 487 F. App'x 795 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012).

In Mascio, supra, the Fourth Circuit held that "remand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful

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<sup>3</sup>Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301, et seq., the term "disability" is defined as an:

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .  
Pass v. Chater, 65 F. 3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995).

review.” 780 F.3d at 636 (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)). This explicit function-by-function analysis is not necessary when functions are irrelevant or uncontested.

In Mascio, the Court also “agree[d] with other circuits that an ALJ does not account ‘for a claimant’s limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.’” 780 F.3d at 638 (quoting Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (joining the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits)). See also SSR 96-8p (where ALJ completes Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”), mental RFC evaluation for use at steps 4 and 5 “requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing various functions … summarized on the PRTF”). “The ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on pace. Only the later limitation would account for a claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence or pace.” Id.

Applying those legal principles to the record here, the undersigned concludes that this matter should be remanded for a new hearing. In his formulation of Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ accounted for her moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, if at all, with a limitation to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks.” (Tr. 26-29). Even if supported by substantial evidence, a limitation to simple tasks or instructions does not “account for a limitation in concentration, persistence or pace.” Id. As in Mascio, “[p]erhaps the ALJ can explain why [Plaintiff’s] moderate limitation in concentration, persistence or pace … does not translate into a limitation in [her] residual functional capacity.... But because the ALJ gave no explanation, a remand is in order.” Id.

#### **IV. RECOMMENDATIONS**

**FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS**, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment" (document #11) be **GRANTED**; that Defendant's "Motion for Summary Judgment" (document #16) be **DENIED**; and that the Commissioner's decision be **REVERSED**, and this matter be **REMANDED** for a new hearing pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).<sup>4</sup>

#### **V. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS**

The parties are hereby advised that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(c), written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and the recommendation contained in this Memorandum must be filed within fourteen (14) days after service of same. Failure to file objections to this Memorandum with the District Court constitutes a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge. Diamond v. Colonial Life, 416 F.3d 310, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005); Wells v. Shriners Hosp., 109 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1997); Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1365 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989). Moreover, failure to file timely objections will also preclude the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985); Diamond, 416 F.3d at 316; Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); Wells, 109 F.3d at 201; Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).

The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation to counsel

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<sup>4</sup>Sentence Four authorizes "a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision ... with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625 (1990).

for the parties; and to the Honorable Frank D. Whitney.

**SO RECOMMENDED AND ORDERED.**

Signed: July 6, 2015



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David S. Cayer  
United States Magistrate Judge

